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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
HONG NGUYEN, : Case No. 970483-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT ESTABLISH THE INTENT ELEMENT OF THE 
CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
The fully marshaled evidence, even when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict1, does not establish Nguyen's 
culpable intent to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery on 
appeal. See Appellant's Brief (flA.B.M) at 6-15. In brief, Nguyen 
asserts that the nature of his actions does not evince the intent 
necessary to support an aggravated robbery conviction. See State 
v. Bovland, 495 P.2d 315, 316 (Utah 1972) (robbery conviction 
sustained only upon requisite showing of intent); A.B. at 8. His 
conduct did not arise to the level of egregious, violent, armed 
behavior contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute and prior 
case law. See State v. Castonquay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983) 
(an act itself does not establish intent; intent may be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence) ; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp. 
1
 The appellant bears the burden of marshaling the evidence 
and then showing that such evidence does not support the 
conviction. See State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah App. 
1992). When a conviction is challenged for insufficient 
evidence, the reviewing court shall view the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 124 (Utah 1989) . 
1997) (robbery); § 76-6-302 (aggravated robbery); A.B. at 8-9. 
Moreover, his conviction does not serve the statutory distinction 
between "aggravated" offenses and less serious conduct, nor the 
corollary deterrent purpose in "discouraging violent behavior in 
the commission of an otherwise nonviolent crime." State v. Seel, 
827 P.2d 954, 962 (Utah App. 1992); see also A.B. at 12-13. Hence, 
Nguyen asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
aggravated robbery conviction. 
The State, however, maintains that the evidence is sufficient 
to support the verdict. See State's Brief ("S.B.") at 5-8. In its 
brief, the State discusses the elements of the offense of 
aggravated robbery and then asserts that the conviction is sound 
because the facts established at trial satisfy those elements. Id. 
In so doing, the State discounts Nguyen's opening brief argument, 
stating that it "misses the point" in discussing intent and fails 
"to address the statutory elements of the crime." Id. at 8-9. 
A. The Argument In Nguyen's Opening Brief Does Not "Miss The 
Point" As The State Asserts. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, Nguyen's contentions in his 
opening brief do not "miss the point." Id. at 9. Intent is an 
element of aggravated robbery that must be proved at trial. 
Castonguav, 663 P.2d at 1326. Indeed, the robbery statute itself 
requires that the person act "intentionally or knowingly." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1) (b) (Supp. 1997). The Utah Supreme 
Court explained that "intent [] must be proved before the conduct 
may be said to be culpable." Castonguav, 663 P.2d at 1326. 
Where, as here, direct evidence of a suspect's state of mind 
2 
is lacking, intent or lack thereof is established through an 
analysis of the circumstantial evidence. Id. With particular 
regard to aggravated robbery, the discussion should include 
assessment of the "acts and conduct of the accused, the nature of 
the weapon used . . . and the manner in which it was used, taken 
together with all the other circumstances in the case." State v. 
Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1982) (citation omitted), 
partially overruled on other grounds by State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 
843, 848 n.5 (Utah 1992) . Accordingly, in order to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the evidence regarding his state of mind, Nguyen 
had to discuss how the circumstantial evidence and the nature of 
his actions did not arise to the level of egregious conduct 
contemplated by the aggravated robbery statute and thereby failed 
to evince culpable intent. See A.B. at 6-15. Accordingly, 
Nguyen's discussion in his opening brief is appropriate and does 
not "miss the point."2 S.B. at 9. 
B. The Evidence Does Not Support The Inference That Nguyen 
Acted With The Intent Necessary To Sustain The Aggravated 
Robbery Conviction. 
The State asserts that all the elements of robbery have been 
2
 In his opening brief, Nguyen refers to an alleged set of 
keys. See A.B. at 12 n.7. The State mischaracterizes Nguyen's 
brief discussion about the keys as supporting his more general 
argument regarding intent, and instead notes that the keys go to 
the issue of identity. See S.B. at 4 n.3. Actually, Nguyen 
specifically states, in accordance with the State, that the keys 
go to the perpetrator's identity. See A.B. at 12 n.7. Nguyen, 
however, notes that Carper's inconsistent testimony regarding the 
keys raises concerns about the sufficiency of the testimony in 
addition to the concerns already present regarding the evidence 
in support of intent. Id. Accordingly, Nguyen's reference to 
the keys is not a misplaced attempt to demonstrate his lack of 
intent. 
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satisfied since Nguyen was stealing the stereo from Carper's car 
when Nguyen waived the screwdriver at Carper in his attempt to flee 
the scene. See S.B.at 5-6; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-3 01 
(Supp. 1997) ("[a] person commits robbery if . . . the person 
intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate force 
against another in the course of committing a theft"). The State 
further asserts that the robbery is aggravated since the 
screwdriver constituted a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of the 
aggravated robbery statute. S.B. at 7; see also Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1995) ("[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing a robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use 
a dangerous weapon"). 
From this evidence, the State claims that Nguyen acted 
"'intentionally or knowingly,'" as required for a conviction of 
aggravated robbery. See S.B. at 6-7. Such evidence, however, does 
not support the inference that Nguyen acted with culpable intent. 
See, A.B. at 6-15; see also Castonquay, 663 P.2d at 1326 (inference 
of intent must be supported by circumstantial evidence). An "act 
in itself does not raise the presumption that it was done with the 
specific intent required to prove the offense." Castoncruay, 663 
P. 2d at 1326. A person acts intentionally when "it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1995). A person acts 
knowingly "with respect to his conduct or the circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
4 
103 (2) .3 
The circumstantial evidence does not establish that Nguyen 
acted with a "conscious objective" to threaten Carper, or even an 
"awareness of his conduct." First, Nguyen did not seize the car 
from Carper's person. Rather, he approached the car while it was 
unattended in a deserted lot, suggesting that he sought to avoid 
people. He did not even bring a weapon, such as a gun or a knife, 
which might otherwise indicate that he anticipated an armed 
encounter. See A.B. at 11-12. Rather, Nguyen only had a 
screwdriver, which he was using to loosen the stereo. R.Ill [69]; 
see A.B. at 9-13. Hence, Nguyen was taken by surprise when Carper 
menacingly confronted him by verbally accosting him and then 
kicking him in the chest after Nguyen exited the car and was trying 
to flee. R. Ill [49-50, 69-71] . Taken off-guard and in the heat of 
the moment, Nguyen intuitively waived the screwdriver in order to 
escape Carper's obvious rage. Such an intuitive reaction, without 
more, cannot be fairly described as "conscious" or "intentional." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (defining "intentional"). Moreover, 
Nguyen's reaction cannot be described as "knowing;" given the swift 
occurrence of events and his intuitive reaction, Nguyen could not 
have been "aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (defining 
3
 The second half of § 76-2-103(2) provides that a person 
acts knowingly "with respect to a result of [the] conduct when he 
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result." Given that Nguyen's actions did not "result" in any 
injury to Carper or other damage, this portion of the statute 
does not pertain to the present discussion of intent. 
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"knowingly").4 
Finally, the State attacks Nguyen's assertion in his opening 
brief that the instant conviction does not serve the statutory 
distinction between "aggravated" offenses and less egregious 
conduct, nor the corollary deterrent purpose in "discouraging 
violent behavior in the commission of an otherwise nonviolent 
crime." See A.B.at 12-14 (citing aggravated robbery cases 
demonstrating the sort of violent, depraved behavior contemplated 
by aggravated robbery statute). The State concedes that Nguyen's 
conduct "falls outside the popular stereotype of aggravated robbery 
as a stickup." S.B. at 9. It nonetheless maintains that Nguyen's 
conviction comports with the statutory distinction between 
aggravated offenses and less egregious conduct," contending that 
Nguyen "used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon" in violation 
of one of the "legislatively enumerated factors of aggravated 
robbery." S.B. at 10. The State further argues that the "jury was 
not, and should not have been, asked to determine how 'egregious' 
4
 The State criticizes Nguyen's depiction of Carper as the 
aggressor, stating that it "fails to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the jury's verdict." S.B. at 9 n.7. 
Nguyen discusses Carper's aggressive behavior, however, to 
demonstrate how Nguyen did not behave in a manner typical of 
those who commit aggravated robbery. In most instances, the 
actor is the aggressor and the victim is the weaker of the two 
who tries to escape but cannot due to the actor's show of force. 
In this situation, however, Nguyen was arguably threatened by 
Carper, who was large and confrontational toward Nguyen. Indeed, 
Carper would not allow Nguyen to flee, but rather told him to 
stop. Nguyen was therefore prompted to waive the screwdriver. 
Given Carper's own aggressive behavior, Nguyen's reaction 
resulted more from fear and a desire to escape than an 
intentional or knowing attempt to use coercive force against 
Carper. 
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they believed defendant's conduct to be." Id. 
Nguyen does not suggest that the jurors should have been 
allowed to make their own subjective determination of egregiousness 
in this case. Id. Rather, Nguyen makes this argument to assist 
this Court in assessing whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support Nguyen's conviction. Reviewing courts historically cite 
statutory distinctions and legislative purpose in deciding whether 
a particular disposition is appropriate in a given case. See, 
e.g., State v. Suniville 741 P.2d 961, 965 (Utah 1987)(conviction 
for aggravated robbery where defendant used menacing gesture plus 
verbal threat instead of gun did not serve statutory distinction 
between robbery and aggravated robbery) ; State v. Farrow, 919 P. 2d 
50 (Utah App. 1996) (upholding warrantless arrest of domestic 
violence suspect under Domestic Violence Act based on context of 
legislation, legislative intent, and public policy); Wells v. 
Children's Aid Soc'v, 681 P.2d 199, 208 (Utah 1984) (holding 
analysis of whether father had "reasonable opportunity" in each 
individual adoption case to comply with statutory requirements 
"would frustrate the statute's purpose to facilitate secure 
adoptions by early clarification of status"); State v. Scieszka, 
897 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Utah App. 1995) ("fundamental rule of 
statutory interpretation requires that a statute 'be looked at in 
its entirety and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to 
be accomplished'") (quotation omitted). Hence, consideration of 
similar information is relevant and valuable to the instant case. 
Such information may not be dispositive, but it provides valuable 
7 
guidance in close cases where, as here, the evidence does not 
overwhelmingly evince a culpable intent to commit aggravated 
robbery. 
Based on the foregoing and contrary to the State's assertion 
in its brief, Nguyen's actions do not evince either an intentional 
or knowing state of mind as required for an aggravated robbery 
conviction. See A.B. at 6-15. The jury could not have reasonably 
concluded that Nguyen acted with the requisite intent where he 
approached an unattended vehicle, did not carry a weapon of force, 
such as a gun or knife, and only waived the screwdriver after 
Carper menacingly confronted Nguyen and blocked his escape. 
Accordingly, Nguyen's conviction fails for insufficient evidence 
since the circumstantial evidence does not support the inference 
that he acted knowingly or intentionally as required by statute. 
Id. 
II. NGUYEN'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED AND JUDGEMENT 
ENTERED FOR THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY OF A 
VEHICLE. 
Since Nguyen's conviction is not supported by sufficient 
evidence, Nguyen requests this Court to exercise its authority 
pursuant to Section 76-1-402(5), Utah Code Annotated (1995), and 
reverse the conviction for aggravated robbery, then enter judgment 
for the lesser included offense of burglary of a vehicle, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-205 (1995) . See A.B. at 15-16; see also State v. 
Bindrup, 655 P.2d 674, 676 (Utah 1982); State v. Bolsinger, 699 
P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
8 
CONCLUSION 
Nguyen respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
aggravated robbery conviction for insufficient evidence and enter 
judgment for burglary of a vehicle. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument. 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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